Deterritorialization of Culture

This newer term corresponds to a newer cultural space [chiefly under western and also in developing countries’ industrialization strategies] that has been created because of deterritorialization of traditional cultural spaces. It even appears to be mandatory along with the natural institutional growth toward modernization. According to Garcia Canclini, this notion refers to ‘the loss of the natural relation between culture with geographic and social territory [including] relocalizations of new and old forms of symbolic production’. Basically with the industrial [technological] modernization, random inflow of popular cultural elements and forms are deterritorializing traditional cultural spaces and releasing cultural signs from any fixed time and space. Noted analyst James Lull has stated that ‘deterritorialization is the [partial] disintegration of human and symbolic constellations and patterns... it is a consequence of the cultural disjuncture... it is one indication of the cultural change that the disjunctures stimulate’.

But theorists interestingly while further deriving the term ‘deterritorialization’ have time and again exemplified the migration of third world people into ‘more developed’ specially western territories. Naturally this migration causes severe uprooting of the traditional cultural base and major disruption of its valuation that compulsively drives individuals to adapt desirably [or undesirably] new cultural base elements for leading a better cultural life. Prof. Lull exemplified this kind of deterritorialization that the African and Asian slave trade in colonial North America, Brazil, and the Carribbean countries ago...and illegal immigrant Mexican farm workers in United States’. In India also such migrations [though within the national territory but in such a vast location, migration often results in the transportation of individual belongings more than 2000 kilometers from one part to another corner of the country] had been a major occurrence always, both in its colonial and post colonial times, from less developed areas to the bit more affluent places. But theorists like Canclini, Lull in this context do not usually accept any definition of newer cultural codification as they desire to identify this phenomenon as quite natural and inevitable as well. They leave it as purely a ‘human matter’.

But the deterritorialization of culture howsoever occurs in human mind, under any circumstance, through only physical migration from any kind of ‘less to affluent’, this theoretical proposition has been reduced to an idealized end that ‘culture never dies, even in conditions of orchestrated repression’. But this is also an open ended conclusion that people from most of the developing countries, while migrating to a better place for enhanced living, invariably opt out the root cultural praxis to make room for adopting better cultural elements and newer praxis. Only thing may be left alive that people would perform some codes of their root cultural practices superficially that would never percolate to the next generations, e.g., organizing Durga Puja festival by the non resident Bengalee people. This global festival is performed quite differently across regions and settlements outside Bengal keeping the rituals almost unchanged. Here this festival can’t make a course of life along with other popular codifications of that region. Baudrillard once very interestingly quoted that ‘we don’t want nature, we want parks; we similarly don’t want exact course of religion but the Durga Puja as festival only. So it is quite naturally discursive and so deterritorialized. We can also argue that a person migrating more than thousand miles for, say, knitting cut piece cloths from far east of India to the farthest west, say, Gujarat, this migration definitely would cause a severe damage to the cultural practices as the person would have to adopt newer cultural praxis as common or essential cultural interfaces and of course along with some superficial ethno-religious practices, what Lull has nucleated as complete root ‘culture’. In terms of social mediation this phenomenon, across traditional class limitations, in the long term would definitely affect individual’s ideology toward his own life pattern. Therefore he has become completely deterritorialized.

Arjun Appadurai argues in this context, ‘...deterritorialization...sometimes...creates exaggerated and intensified senses of criticism or attachment to politics in the home state. Deterritorialization, whether of Hindus, Sikhs, Palestinians, or Ukranians, is now at the core of a variety of global fundamentalisms, Islamic and Hindu fundamentalism...’. But this example does not ensure common people’s disorientation toward such, if we at all say fundamentalism in general, because apart from fanatic religious outbreaks, or counter political outbreaks, fundamentalist principles, even after killing innocent mass, still comfortably exist both peripheries in common psyche of general people who do not at all participate in any such practices.

Thus deterritorialization analysis must accept the theoretical process of discourse analysis so that the signification of ‘deterritorialization’, ‘fundamentalism’, ‘symbolic power’ and many other terms can be perpetrated and understood appropriately. However deterritorialization of culture should not claim any importance in a determinate cultural space because ‘class’ analysis even can perform here better than deterritorialization. But on the other hand such deterritorialization motion can well initiate an important debate on globalization of culture. It is not really the postmodernism in the alternative or any such related elitist theories what can rescue popular culture from being either dominated by the nationalist force or transcorporate ‘global’ force. The prime question here to be raised is the people’s struggle and the resultant cultural practice which is completely independent of any given format. If it is political or cultural it would then initiate ideology, as Hall argues, ‘ideology can no longer be seen as a dependent variable, a mere reflection of a pre-given reality in the mind. Nor are its outcomes predictable by derivation from some simple determinist logic. They depend on the balance of forces in a historical conjuncture: on the politics of signification...’.

Media effect and cultural studies: From Culture Industry to Global Postmodern

With the coming out of the notion of culture industry, in mid forties, under ultra-nationalist and high-capitalist control, media evolved a massive mass culture for the atomized subordinated audience producing mass-mediated cultural artifacts within the nationalist context of industrial production [Kellner, 1997]. So the produced and mediated commodities manifested identical features as the other ‘produced’ of mass production did. These were: commodification of the produced, standardization or homogenization and enmassification of the produced. The culture-industry, as Kellner accords, had the specific function of providing ideological legitimation of the existing capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into the framework of the capitalist system. Thus culture industry, in Frankfurt discourse of study, produces a consumer society that stabilizes the contemporary capitalist system, formulates new strategies for political change, political emancipation that becomes social norms imposed on common working class. This development thus however transcends the traditional or classical Marxist notion of existence of working class as prime instrument of future revolution. 

So a direct effect of mass media on the common individual and working class existed all through the development of mass mediation communication technology in the last century. Herbert Marcuse [1941] in his article “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology” argued that technology posits a “mode of organizing and perpetuating social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behaviour patterns, an instrument for control and domination.”

The notion behind such argumentation of media dominance by the Frankfurt cultural theorists was based on some on-hand life time experiences. In Nazi Germany they experienced absolutist collaboration of centralized media and vertical dominance of the state machinery toward controlling media and mediation promoting monolithic mass cultural instruments to produce a homogenized Fascist culture. On the other hand while in exile in the United States they started believing that the so called American ‘popular culture’ in the name of ‘liberal-pluralism’ was also very much motivated toward the interest of the state capitalist jingoism and governed by the transnational industrial corporations.

The governmentality of such popular culture reflects another scale of mass production and ensures mass consumption through certain commercial value-systems, belief-system that serves American Capitalism as a whole. Individuated space in both systems [in German Mass Society and American Popular Society], what they called ‘Fordism’ [mass production-mass consumption to ensure homogeneity of capital, i.e. mass desire, mass taste, mass behaviour (Kellner, 1997)], were never allowed to blossom beyond overshadow of the techno-capitalist system. Individual thought and desire were brutally suppressed in the Fordist consumer society.

What however was thought of Fordist mass production and mass consumption trap by the Frankfurt theorists was criticized by later theorists like Walter Benjamin et. al. and theorists of British cultural Studies only in terms of the hypothesis of taking the ‘mass’ quite atomized and crippled. Emerging in the Post-Fordist era [roughly the post second world war period] they thought on the one hand, that culture industry also could articulate important roles of individuals and on the other hand ‘atomized mass’ as working class could also be believed as an instrument of social and political metamorphosis against the onslaught of mass culture of the culture industry.

In this course of development of cultural studies ‘Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies’ of Birmingham University started working on class, gender, ethnicity, nationality and media culture while exploring revitalizing elements in the ‘working class’ through extensive study on effects of television, radio, newspapers, film, advertisements on individual audience in terms of cultural texts and they also emphasized on plurality of individual audience and politics of ideology and signification of the text. Thus in this regard the notion of British Cultural Studies appeared highly political and they could reach the core of mass-cultural domination and the core of consumer society. Theorists like Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall opposed in this context the mass cultural theoretical notions of configuring media effect that takes individual audience as ‘heavy viewers’ and ‘active audience’ beyond its natural plurality and spontaneity, believing that such preconception or predomination certainly devours the individuated space in public spheres. So they started theorizing social mediation praxis and processes.

But notwithstanding all oppositions regarding the revival question of working class in the growing consumer society, both schools of thought were unanimous on the notion of integration of the working class beyond its individual class-cultural identity and the decline of its revolutionary consciousness in the capitalist consumer society. Birmingham theorists, specially Stuart Hall here formulated the notion of the ‘politics of signification’ where they recognized any form of alternative voices against the massive institutionalization of thought and hegemony of the dominant cultural ideology. In this way of rediscovering the working class ideology cultural theorists [French, British and German] resurfaced the capitalist integrated consumerist media politics and created an alternative space for common audience to combat monolithic media effect on them. Noted theorist Douglas Kellner supplemented beautifully the Frankfurt notion of cultural studies, in his words, that ‘...mass culture and communication were instrumental in generating the modes of thought and behaviour appropriate to a highly organized and massified social order...mass consumption and culture were indispensable to producing a consumer society based on homogeneous needs and desires for the mass produced and a mass society based on social organization and homogeneity. It is culturally the era of highly controlled network radio and television, insipid top forty pop music, glossy Hollywood jingoistic films, national magazines and other mass-produced cultural artifacts’.

Basically ‘media effect’ analysis is highly a political discourse in terms of its theoretical binarity between capitalist mass culture toward an integration or homogeneity of consumer society and the notion of individuality in pluralist cultural possibilities. Media effect in consumerist societal configuration takes individuals as mass and considers them quite proactive toward mediated contents, i.e. heavy viewers of media and prone to the consumerist effect of mediation. This notion of understanding media effect devours the individuated space i.e. political space that let individuals be the natural victim of mass culture, ends up with the mass consumption of obscenity, titillation, pornography and violence. Thus through consumerist media effect analysis one can only consummate to the extent of consumption of mediated content.

Politics of the Active Audience Research:

Following the cultural nuances about the effect of mass cultural domination over the mass among two theoretical schools [Frankfurt and early British Cultural Studies] were almost of a unanimous opinion of domination of mass culture which makes audience atomized. But on the other hand, as argued above, Benjamin, Hall (et.al.) thought of rejuvenating the audience psyche by counter generation of media use.

But other than such political and cultural research groups [Frankfurt and Birmingham groups] some communication theorists propounded a new theoretical discourse to judge media effect with statistical figuration. Communication researchers J.G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch have classified the above two discourses of media effect research in a temporal order like Marxist media research and political communication research. While discarding the Marxist notion on the one hand, they have made certain further time-spatial subcultural grouping of the media effect research discourse. ‘Research into political communication effects has undergone at least two major shifts of direction since its inception. In an initial phase, which lasted from approximately the turn of the twentieth century to the outbreak of the Second World War, the mass media were attributed with considerable power to shape opinion and belief. In the second period, from...the 1940s to the early 1960s, they were believed to be largely impotent to initiate opinion and attitude change, although they could relay certain forms of information and reinforce existing beliefs...’ (Blumler & Gurevitch, The Political Effects of Mass Communication; Culture, Society and Media, pp240).

There was, however, a third category of researchers like, McQuail, P. Lazarsfeld, H. Gaudet et. al. who found the ‘audience’ very much proactive to any media content to gratify their temporal needs. According to James Lull, instead of asking “What media do to its audience” this ‘uses and gratifications group’ pounded upon the notion “what do people do with the media”. This notion however according to them signifies the active audience.

This brand of argument as ‘media effect’ has resulted in a natural political polarization not only in media research but also in ideological discourse around the world. The active audience notion virtually tried to move away from the political media research discourse and gave the ‘transcorporate commercial mediation’ a global space to operate. Moreover the active audience research stands against all earlier quantitative ‘effect research’ with a notion that statistical figurations can hardly establish human behavioural pattern or metamorphosis. James Lull asks in this context, ‘how can we determine the particular impact of mass media compared to other environmental influences when analyzing human consciousness and behaviour?’

Extending however Blumler’s notion, Joseph Klapper (1960) meanwhile has derived that media can reinforce human behaviour than changing it, putting Wilbur Schramm’s notion of uncertain media effect forward that media can influence some of its audience, in some time about some things (Lull 1995). Transcending all earlier empirical media effect notions that focused only on negative outcomes, active audience researchers considered audience members are not at all passive receivers of media content or victims of media (Lull, 1995). They have explained that individual audience play always active role to use their media to gratify their individual needs. But uses & gratifications researchers too set on empirical statistical figurations to measure the extent of gratification. James Lull in his analysis concerns, ‘what’s more uses & gratifications researchers - like the effects researchers before them - theorize audience activity in behaviourist terms. Adapting quantitatively based methodologies and theories from psychology and sociology, ultimately these researchers also regard audience members essentially as rats in a maze or beans in a jar. Human emotion, cognition and behaviour are once again reduced to statistical data’ [Lull, 1995].

Therefore it can well be accomplished that as a whole of the discourse of mass communication research, the politics remains in older binary opposition between Marxist tradition of communication research on the one side and the techno-capitalist empirical research of human behavioural order on the other, along with an internal debate over the legitimacy of statistical figuration to measure human behavioural order. So the politics of active audience research reaches out to a highly ideological morphology that seeks out emancipation of the audience.

Changing discourse in social outcomes of mediation:

Effect theorists have time and again identified social transformation through various case studies that show the pivotal role of media in the metamorphosis. But they all seem to have stopped their rediscovery journey while reaching in so called globalization era. They have all confined themselves in a binary oppositional lane where state power and awaiting new media development live in a sufficiently coexistent space. Therefore globalizing change in media and society, for them, has become an awaited destination. This is nowhere difficult to identify how state powers intercept freedom of media, from Fascist governments to the ex-colonial national governments of the third world nations etc. But it also seems to be sufficiently pertinent to identify or rediscover the postmodern transcorporate media domination over fragmented subcultural groups of audience. Basically institutions ranging from the central state power to global corporate power manifest an isomorphic outcome to create a mass society either centrally or in some social pockets, even if Lull’s conceptual generalization of diversity is taken into account.

From mission and revolution to outright consumption:

On the other hand cultural studies which earlier had considered media culture as a critical element to the techno-capitalist culture industry and prescribed setting an alternative goal toward revolutionizing people, from mid seventies to the present, transformed from its socialist revolutionary outlook to a postcommercial postmodernist trend of identity and gradually became less and less critical to capitalist media culture and the contemporary postcommodified culture. Like uses & gratifications approach the ball has been thrown to audience’s court in terms of reception of mediated content, consumption and satisfaction or gratification, thus turning around from earlier notions like how media texts are being produced in media industries. Kellner argues in this context, ‘from this perspective the proliferating media culture, postmodern architecture, shopping malls, and the culture of the postmodern spectacle became the promoters and palaces of a new stage of technocapitalism, the latest stage capital, encompassing a postmodern image and consumer culture...’

Therefore as Kellner rightly argues that the new rise of global technocapitalism and finance-capitalism promotes the new turn of postmodern cultural studies. This ideological shift is a new revisionism (McGuigan, 1992, Kellner, The Farnkfurt School and British Cultural Studies: A Missed Articulation) in cultural studies which even ignores the Derridean space of intercontextuality or the protest against space domination. This does not produce or generate individuated cultural space but set a new cultural populism which alternately produces the same but oppositional degree of mass culture for mass production, treats audience an individual creature. Although this turn in cultural studies seems to devour the space of any grand narrative of domination, historical teleology, pseudo-liberation (both capitalist and socialist) but at the same time confronts with the Marxist derivatives by which the notion of capitalist domination over an individual and social audience could have been identified. This would then be the political articulation of struggle of an individual and a society to organize a revolution.

Politics of margin in global postmodern:

As argued earlier, the nuances between British cultural studies and other forms of western cultural studies were largely going beyond any modernist historical narratives toward either a political revolutionary narrative of struggle or a multicultural consumerist fragmentation of narratives. Although both thoughts arguing the same reduction of narratives from any social time and space, the latter multiculturalist fragmentation realizes new control of over determined capital and new order of technologies that offers audience the sense of a new ordained space for receiving mediated texts. So a new margin beyond the traditional political space is drawn to over-determine the human exposure and use of media. This new margin beyond the traditional social margins attempts to restore the cannon of western civilization, as Kellner exemplifies as Thatcher and Reagan eras, Bush (Junior) to Barack Obama era of rejuvenation of American nationality etc. But for the rest of the world it involves pluralizing of culture (Kellner 1997), opening of traditional political margins, what Hall supposed that to be away from western cultural domination, but nowadays totally controlled, regulated by transnational corporations and media conglomerates, the new cultural arbitrators, new missionaries of techno-cultural capitalism reduced to a newer trend or grandnarrative of the new world order. Thus culture industries in the global postmodern era has reached its culminating point while a handful number of media conglomerates through ruthless merger and acquisitions controls the information order and entertainment industries of the world. Kellner argues that ‘...the globalization of media culture is an imposition of the lowest denominator homogeneity of global culture on a national and local culture, in which CNN, BBC, NBC, the Murdock channels and so on impose the most banal uniformity and homogeneity on media culture throughout the world...’. So a new order of monocultural margin controlled by the media conglomerates has been imposed on the political struggles of various subcultural and political groupings.

Globalization of Culture: Rise of Cosmetic Heterogeneity

Does global culture exist at all? To start with Fredric Jameson, If globalization of economic practice by and large means absolute liberalization of both developed and developing nations including US-allies, or if we demand for optimal and independent use of technologies, do then we have to accept Jameson’s notion of ‘superficial’, ‘depthless’, and outright ‘commercial’ mediated postmodern cultural forms? This is otherwise not at all trivial as Lull argues that he would rather prefer to ‘concentrate on more concrete developments by emphasizing how people interpret their changing worlds, make them meaningful, and advance their personal, social, and cultural interests’. But this may also look too much utopian when huge number of have-nots is to be considered. They are nowhere in a position to deal with, define, advance, their individual cultural interests. It is true even for the middle class people also throughout the globe. So let’s not talk only about their social or socio-cultural interests. Even a middle class Chinese wage earner [earning $200 p.m. in Chinese currency, her husband was earning at that time, in 2000, was nearing $300] Zhang Iazhu, one of my once close associates, was hardly in a position to build up a duplex house for their own when this is not really an impossible task for a middle class Indian wage earner of almost same dimension.

The most dreaded metanarrative of our time is ‘globalization’ which refers to a massive sense of somewhat ‘away cultural’ notion that promotes, according to Lull, the scope of current developments in communication and culture, but more than that in a specific contextual reality. Though Prof. Lull has given an enhanced outlook toward modern developments [mostly corporate developments], does not believe that we have become one people. He argues further, ‘it is true that potent homogenizing forces including military weaponry, advertising techniques, dominant languages, media formats, and fashion trends undeniably affect consciousness and culture in virtually every corner of the world...but these political, economic-cultural influences do not enter cultural contexts uniformly...’. But the main problem with this analysis is that for people of most developing nations this plurality is often considered as ‘homogenizing forces’ as the prime effects of ‘globalization’ over their natural cultural heterogeneity that may further be extended to the natural mixing of symbolic cultural elements. These even affect all interactions in ‘diverse local conditions’, what Lull has tried to save as an imperative to establish that we are not affected by such homogenizing forces. Furthermore such homogenizing global cultural forces have not accomplished their globalization journey but received sufficient on-going protest from alternative socialist forums in different parts of the world. So Lull’s notion that ‘we will not become one people’ seems to be quite different from the on-going anti-globalization movements.

However let’s now move into the nitty-gritty of the metanarrative ‘globalization’ specially ‘of culture’ and ‘communication’. Many theorists, like James Lull, Arjun Appadurai have time and again tried to establish a root natural heterogeneity of cultural praxis that let people not become so called ‘globalized’. They believe at the same time that such homogenizing forces may affect consciousness and culture but do not surprisingly recognize the invading motives of the globalizing forces. Anthony D. Smith has however defined the practicing heterogeneity of culture, ‘...if by culture is meant a collective mode of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, styles, values and symbols, then we can only speak of cultures, never just culture; for a collective mode of life, or a repertoire of beliefs, values etc., presupposes different modes and repertoires in a universe of modes and repertoires. Hence, the idea of a global culture is a practical impossibility...’

I am now interested in talking about the mediated global, commercial cultural forms and codes that evidently accompany the mediated cultural contents that Lull et.al. exclude from their globalizing list. A stark difference of outlook has therefore always been evident between neoliberal ‘cultural development’ theorists and anti-neoliberal and progressive social thoughts.

However noted American sociologist Arjun Appadurai has pointed out that cultural heterogeneity [the idea that culture takes many forms] is much more valid than any theory of encroaching cultural sameness [Lull, 1995]. He has however excluded any possibility of taking globalization as Americanization, or neoliberal postcommerciality whatever. He argues: ‘...global homogenization invariably subspeciate into an argument about Americanization, or an argument about commoditization, and very often these two arguments are very closely linked. What these arguments fail to consider is that at least as rapidly as forces from the various metropolises are brought into these societies, they tend to become indigenized in one way or another: this is true of music and housing styles as much as it is true of science and terrorism, spetacles and constitutions...’. But surprisingly such diaspora of cultural arguments and elements do not at all designate the contemporary form of globalization and quite motivated to subscribe a progressive historical outlook which was bitterly countered, derecognized earlier during war and even post war period of time. Excolonial countries were the worst sufferers of such colonizing motives of the West. They have never felt the necessity of using Asian societies and markets until the contemporary phase of globalization when they feel an extraordinary need of Asian market and social structures because of severe internal economic and social crisis. Noted corporate strategist Kenichi Ohmae has thus pointed out: ‘the capital markets in most of the developed countries are flush with excess cash for investment. Japan, e.g. has the equivalent of US$10 trillion stored away. Even where a country itself hovers close to bankruptcy, there is often a huge accumulation of money in pension funds and life insurance programmes. The problem is that suitable and suitably large - investment opportunities are not often available in the same geographies where this money sits. As a result the capital markets have developed a wide variety of mechanisms to transfer it across national borders. Today nearly 10% of US pension funds are invested in Asia. Ten years ago that degree of participation in Asian markets would have been unthinkable’.

What they have done is, therefore accepting a growth of cosmetic cultural heterogeneity in every ideal term but deliberately rule out the politics of signification and so the appropriate installation of plurality. So the question of indigenous cultural forms being affected is nowhere discussed in their texts. 

Scape theory:

Nevertheless while he is stressing upon the impossibilities of cultural homogenization and any kind of domination over any particular form of culture Arjun Appadurai has classified ‘heterogeneity’ of culture into five ‘scapes’ which according to him, can assure such impossibilities of homogenization of culture. These five scapes are: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, ideoscapes, and mediascapes. 

Ethnoscapes refer to the deterritorializing migration of people from one part of the globe to another in various forms, as analyzed by John Tomlinson, like, tourists, immigrants, refugees, guestworkers, exile, and so on [Lull, 1995].

Technoscapes refer to the movement of corporate technologies from one place to another. Globalization of techno-capitalist development remains the prime consideration.

Financescapes refer to the undeterred movement of finance capital and industrial capital from any transnational source to any newly developing region, e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund, foreign development funds of some European states, like DFID of British government etc. 

Appadurai argues in this context that these scapes are quite disjunctive to each other and also unpredictable in nature but fail to understand the common unipolar and irreversible cultural factor ‘domination’ jointly perpetrated by the transnational corporates and group of nations led by the United States. Massive military aggressions in several nations, like, massacre in Indonesia, Mexico in late sixties; devastation in several West-Asian countries in two-three decades from early sixties; economic-cultural-military-industry axis domination in several Latin American states, like, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Costarica, Panama, Brazil, an other Boliverian states; allied participation in Gulf War in subsequent two stages [1990s and 2003-04] completely destroying Iraq and glorious remaining of the oldest Mesopotamian civilization, massacre in Afghanistan; promoting the civil wars actively in African states and former East-European nation states; and most recently nuclear deal with India follow so many earlier economic and cultural blockades since last forty years.

However by Mediascape, Appadurai argues about the transnational telecast of mass media technologies and mass produced images they constitute. Audience, according to Lull, here constructs narrative of the images produced and shown. This concept refers to when we see a Mexican film we construct an image of common Mexican lives. 

By Ideoscape Appadurai has expressed political images and in ideological domain, Lull has accommodated fundamental rights, freedom, responsibility, equality, discipline, democracy etc. which make up ideoscapes specified for different regions and habitations.

Thus by these five disjunctive ‘scapes’ Appadurai has emphasized on heterogeneity in diffusion of innovative and adoption of new ideas that overrule any form of hegemonic interaction, homogeneous ideation and influence. Mass media, as a special referent, communicate diverse and extended, polysemic contents that nowhere correspond to any homogeneity of message. So homogeneous constellation in cultural praxis is impossible.

On the other hand Stuart Hall while moving into the multiplicity of encoding and decoding of mediated message discards such automated outcome that human beings naturally conceive culture that is independent of any form of domination. Hall in this context while installing the same plurality of meaning of the message structures has stressed upon underlying struggle performed by the decoder of message. He conceived the message having close relation with the production function where lives the struggle for meaning and identity as well as the pertinence of domination. He quite substanively argues that polysemy must not be confused with plurality because in every social space classifications in cultural political orders are being imposed to constitute a ‘dominant cultural order’ that rules the dominant or preferred meaning for its audience. And this dominant cultural order however articulated by dominant social institutions.

Encoding-Decoding model:

Hall argues in this model that ‘broadcasting structures must yield encoded messages in the form of a meaningful discourse. The institutional-societal relations of production must pass under the discursive rules of language for its product to be realized. This initiates a further differentiated moment, in which the formal rules of discourse are in dominance. Before this message can have an ‘effect’, satisfy a need or to be put to a ‘use’ it must first be appropriated as meaningful discourse and be meaningfully decoded. It is this set of decoded meanings which have an effect, influence, entertain, instruct, or persuade with very complex perceptual, cognitive, emotional, ideological, or behavioural consequences’. Thus with this relational discourse structure creates a code and yields a text-message and also determines ‘effect’, ‘uses & gratifications’.

The model however reveals that meaning structure of encoding may not be same with that of decoding. They do not constitute ‘immediate identity’ and codes are not symmetrical, i.e., codes produced by the encoder-producer may not be symmetrical with the codes of decoder-receiver. So denotive meaning of a code largely depends on situational ideologies and therefore class struggle in language is almost inevitable that signs and codes enter into struggle over meanings. Hall argues in this context that literal or denotive meanings are not outside ideology and always perpetrate struggle. 

Cultivation theory revisited: Audience brought back from ‘hyperreactive’ allegation

As it has been already argued that polysemic nature of codes [verbal, visual, televisual etc.] basically reveal asymmetry between codes of encoder-producer and that of decoder-receiver and lack of equivalence between them. This functional proposition is successfully used to explain Gerbner’s notion of ‘television content’ where such lack of equivalence can be widely seen among the audience. Hall argues that ‘it might also transform our understanding of audience reception, reading and response as well’.

Cultivation analysis in Gerbner’s notion tells us the long term heavy viewing of televisual contents [preferred ones] leads to a substantive change in audience behaviour and ideology. But as Hall argues that televisual content or television programmes are not at all behavioural inputs. Interestingly he remarks that ‘though Gerbner has mentioned that representations of violence on TV are not violence in reality but the message or image of violence, but we continue doing research on the question of violence as if we are unable to comprehend this epistemological distinction’. Gerbner however condemns the audience for becoming hyperreactive to such projection of not violence but the image of violence.

Hall in this context has explained semiology of televisual signs and its atachment to the immediate cultural praxis. According to Hall, all televisual signs are more than a ‘sign’, are a combination of visual and aural ‘discourses’, thus become an Peirce’s iconic sign that even depend on the things represented. Thus studying visual signs or languages often leads to a deep confusion and controversy is the first outcome in the society. He argues further that visual language transforms [translates] three dimensional reality into a two dimensional plane ‘it cannot be the referent or concept it signifies. The dog in the film can bark but it cannot bite’. So the reality exists outside the language but constantly mediated in this language. So our knowledge [even that may be discursive] has been produced and assured in this way. Hall says that true and transparent representation of the ‘real’ is not our knowledge but how it is being articulated is going to be the thing we are interested in and this is the ‘code’. Thus code analysis is as important as to analyze our understanding to it and according to Hall, Peirce’s iconic signs are similar to the Sausseurean code [the particular cultural arrangement of signs]. In his words, ‘...naturalism and realism - the apparent fidelity of the representation to the thing or the concept represented - is the result, the effect, of a certain specific articulation of language on the real...’. So even continuous observation of the image or the mesage of violence [not the real] would cause a serious effect on audience psyche or behaviour.